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Abstract 
The content host services (like Dropbox, OneDrive, and 
Google Drive) used by enterprise customers are deployed 
either on premise or in cloud. Because users may store 
business-sensitive data (contents) in these hosting services, 
they may want to protect their data from disclosure to anyone 
else, even IT administrators. Unfortunately, even contents 
(files) are encrypted in the hosting services, they sometimes 
are still accessible to IT administrators today. The sensitive 
data could be exposed to public if the IT administrator turns 
malicious (like disgruntled employee) or his account is 
compromised by hackers. 
 
We propose an end-to-end encryption (E2EE) solution to 
address this challenge. The user data is encrypted at client 
side (mobile device) and remains encrypted in transit and at 
rest on server. Specifically, we design a new method to allow 
master secret recover and escrow, while protecting them 
from being accessed by malicious administrators. In 
addition, we present a content (file) encryption scheme that 
achieves privacy, and granular access control. And it can be 
seamlessly integrated with major content host services used 
by business users today. 
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End-to-end file encryption; key recovery and escrow; data 
security and privacy 
1. Introduction 
Nowadays, content hosting services used by enterprise 
customers are deployed either on premise or in cloud. IT 
administrators can access employees’ contents (files) stored 
in hosting services and break the data privacy, even when the 
contents are encrypted. In a PKI based organization, IT 
administrators not only have the highest privileges in 
company’s computer systems, but also own and manage the 
identity systems like active directory. This gives them the 
power to break employees’ data security.  
For example, an IT administrator can acquire the private 
keys of an employee at key generation, recovery or escrow 
phases [1][2]. Moreover, he sometimes can install spyware 
on employee’s device and steal the sensitive data on client 
side. So, when an IT administrator turns malicious (like 
disgruntled employee) or his account is hacked by attackers, 
the sensitive contents of employees stored in hosting 
services are in danger of being compromised, no matter 
whether they are encrypted or not. In the paper, we call both 
malicious IT administrators and hackers who compromise 
the IT administrators’ accounts root attackers. To best of our 
knowledge, how to protect employees’ cloud data from root 
attackers is not thoroughly tackled in academic and 
industry.  
Currently, major cloud storage service vendors like Google, 
Microsoft and Dropbox don’t provide E2EE services to 
customers because of business and legal considerations, e.g., 
they may want to scan customers’ cloud data to provide extra 
services [3]. However, this is not desirable to many 
enterprise customers who require high-standard data 
security and privacy, especially for highly regulated 
industries such as all current healthcare. Other vendors try to 
solve this problem by adding E2EE on top of existing cloud 
storage services provided big vendors [4][5], or building the 
E2EE capabilities into their own cloud storage services 
[6][7]. Unfortunately, all these solutions only address the 
concerns of untrusted cloud storages, but not root attackers 
who can get the logon credentials and encryption keys of 
target employees, and decrypt their cloud contents. 
To defending against root attackers, we leverage trusted 
execution environments (TEE) [8][9], and construct a new 
E2EE scheme, which can not only prevent root attackers 
from accessing employees’ master secret used to encrypt the 
contents, but also offer the features friendly to enterprise 
customers, such privacy and granular access control. It’s also 
a practical solution and can be integrated with any content 
applications with minor engineering efforts.  
2. Background 
2.1 Current E2EE Solutions  
Today, a typical (and simplified) encryption process of a 
E2EE solution is as below: 1. a private and public key pair 
is generated on user’s device; 2. The user uses his password 
to encrypt the private key via a password-based key 
derivation algorithm like PBKDF2[10] or Bcrypt [11]; 3. 
The encrypted private key and origin public key are send to 
a remote key server; 4. when a content application on device 
is going to encrypt a file, it checks if the private key is 
available locally, if not, the content application downloads 
the encrypted private key and ask user to type in the 
password to decrypt the private key; 4. A file key (symmetric 
key) is generated and used to encrypt the file , and the file 
key is encrypted using the private key; 5. The encrypted file 
and file key are sent to the file hosting server.   
To share the file with another user, the content application 
locates the recipient's public key from key server, and uses 
it to encrypt the file key, which is sent to the hosting service 
along with the encrypted file and file key. The recipient can 
use his private key to decrypt the file key and file 
sequentially. Moreover, to assure the integrity and 
authenticity, a signing key pair could be created and used to 
sign the encrypted file and file key(s).  
2.2 Technical Challenges  
In this paper, we define the master secret as one encryption 
key that can be used to directly decrypt a target encrypted 
content and keys. In 2.1, master secret is the private key used 
to encrypt the file key. There are three ways to protect master 
secrets in practice: 1. Using password to derive shared keys 
and then encrypt the master secrets [12], as what 2.1 does; 2. 
Regenerating the master secrets via mnemonic phrases, 
which are written down to papers [13]; 3. Storing master 
secrets to smart cards or other external devices like USB 
drive [14]. 
However, all three methods have weaknesses: password 
could be forgotten; the papers recording mnemonic phrases 
and smart cards (USB drives) could be lost. If any of these 
situations occur, encrypted could be unrecoverable and lost 
forever [15].  The tougher challenges come from law 
enforcements like US government. As required by laws, 
some companies ask employees to send unencrypted master 
secrets to key escrow services [2], so that law enforcement 
can access the master secrets and decrypt the contents of 
target employee under certain circumstances. Unfortunately, 
there is no guarantee that these key escrow services (and 
stored master secretes) are inaccessible to root attackers. 
In addition to master secret protection challenges, current 
E2EE-based content applications suffer one or more of 
following weaknesses [4][5][6][7] : 1. Not supporting file 
sharing; 2. Coarse-grained file access control; 3. Privacy 
information disclosure; 4. Susceptible to rollback attacks; 5. 
Not supporting link-based file sharing; 6. Not flexible to 
support various file hosting services. In this paper, we 
propose a new E2EE solution that is composed of two parts: 
master secret protection (in Section 3) and content 
encryption (in Section 4). The first part is designed to protect 
master secret from root attackers; the second part is to 
address the common encryption weaknesses suffered by 
current E2EE-based content applications. 
2.3 Trusted Execution Environments 
A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is a secure area 
inside a main processor. It runs in parallel of the operating 
system, in an isolated environment. It guarantees that the 
code and data loaded in the TEE are protected with respect 
to confidentiality and integrity. Trusted applications running 
in a TEE have access to the full power of a device's main 
processor and memory, whereas hardware isolation protects 
these components from user installed applications running in 
the main operating system. Software and cryptographic 
isolations inside the TEE protect the different contained 
trusted applications from each other. Secure Enclave and 
TrustZone are two popular TEE solutions used on mobile 
devices [8][9]. 
2.4 Scope and Threat Model 
Assume there is a PKI system in a company, called 
IDENTITY, which provides full-fledged identity services to 
employees. When IDENTITY issues certificates (and key 
pairs) to an employee, it’s assumed that the private key is 
generated on employee’s local devices and are never 
disclosed to IDENTITY server in plaintext. An enterprise 
content application is composed of client component and 
server component, namely CLIENT and SERVER. 
SERVER can be deployed on premise, in cloud or both. 
Employees’ company devices support TEEs, where their 
private keys are stored, and CLIENTs run.   
Here, we assume that adversaries are root attackers who can 
take control of SERVER, company’s PKI system and key 
escrow service. Device TEEs are resistant to root attackers, 
so employees’ private keys and CLIENT’s operations are 
secure. In addition, root attackers are able to create fake 
employee accounts with valid PKI and IDENTITY 
identities, and they can use these fake accounts to run 
CLIENTs on the devices under their control. Further, root 
attackers can masquerade some real employees by stealing 
their PKI private keys and passwords when their devices 
don’t have TEE support. So, some CLIENTs could be 
malicious. 
In the new E2EE solution, we aim to maintain the 
confidentiality and integrity of a target employee’s contents 
stored in SERVER. The availability of encrypted contents is 
not guaranteed here, because root attackers can simply delete 
all the contents in SERVER to make them unavailable.  
3. Master Secret Protection 
Without loss of generality, we don’t specify the exact 
cryptography algorithms like (RSA encryption) and their 
parameters (like 256-bit AES key) used in this paper, 
because we believe they should be application (and 
implementation) dependent and specific. Instead, we use the 
general words like “symmetric encryption” to represent 
these algorithms.  
As mentioned above, an employee has PKI key pair (PK, 
SK) issued by IDENTITY. A master key K_master is 
generated for the content application in CLIENT. Note an 
employee may have multiple copies of CLIENTs run on 
multiple devices. All CLIENTs of this employee share same 
PKI key pair and master key. For each file, the employee 
uses CLIENT to generate file key K_file.  
Since file key (K_file) is encrypted by master key 
(K_master), so master secret of this employee is his master 
secret. The PKI private key (SK) is used to access other 
employees’ contents shared to this employee, and when it is 
lost and unrecoverable, this employee can directly ask the 
owner employee to re-encrypt this content with new PKI 
public key (PK’) that this employee holds. So, SK is not part 
of master secret. The details of content encryption are 
described in Section 4.  
3.1 Master Secret Recovery 
We employ two recovery methods: password-protected 
server recovery and distance-bounded social recovery. The 
first method is trivia: employee creates a password and use 
it to encrypt his master secret through a password-based key 
derivation algorithm. The encrypted master secret is stored 
to SERVER. When recovery is needed, the employee 
downloads encrypted master secret from SERVER to 
CLIENT, and then type in his password to decrypt the master 
secret. When employee forget his password, or the encrypted 
master secret is not available on SERVER, e.g., accidently 
deleted by owner, he need resort to distance-bounded social 
recovery.  
3.1.1 Distance-bounded Social Recovery 
The basic idea of distance-bounded social recovery is to split 
the master secret into multiple sub-secrets (called shards) 
using some secret sharing algorithm (Shamir’s Secret 
Sharing is a classic one [16]). And then distribute these 
shards to the CLIENTs of peer employees nearby. The 
physical distance control is achieved by running the secret 
sharing through peer-to-peer communication over short 
distance communication channels such Bluetooth Low 
Energy (BLE) or Near-field Communication (NFC). Before 
sending the shards, the owner employee is required to 
explicitly confirm the authenticities of recipient employees 
based on his witness of their physical existence.  
 
Fig 1. Master Secret Sharing Process  
Secret sharing algorithms possess fault tolerance: as long as 
k of n recipients (n > k) are honest and benign, then original 
secret can be restored. Recall that some CLIENTs might be 
malicious, and this fault tolerance property is necessary. The 
communication between owner employee and peer 
employees are secured by using their PKI certificates, and 
protocol details are up to application. The secret sharing 
process for the master secret is as below: 
1. Shard computation: using chose secret sharing 
algorithm to compute n shards, and output (S1, 
S2, … Sn) 
2. Peer selection: owner CLIENT scans local peer-
to-peer network; randomly chooses n peer 
CLIENTs running in TEEs and propose them to 
the owner by displaying peer employees’ PIIs like 
names, emails and pictures (if possible). If owner 
cannot confirm the physical existence of a 
proposed peer employee, he should reject this 
proposal, otherwise, accept it.  
3. For ith chosen peer CLIENT, Owner CLIENT 
sends it the ith shard (Si) and public key 
(PK_owner).   
4. ith chosen peer CLIENT confirms to owner 
CLIENT that (Si, PK_owner) is received; then 
uses its master key to encrypt Si and upload the 
ciphertext of Si and PK_owner to SERVER. 
5. Once getting the confirmation from ith peer 
CLIENT, owner CLIENT adds peer employee 
(PK_peer_i) to the peer list 
6. Step 2 to 4 is repeated until n shards are 
successfully sent to n peer CLIENTs.  
7. Owner CLIENT uploads the peer list to SERVER. 
To reconstruct the master secret, owner CLIENT downloads 
peer list from SERVER, and visit each peer CLIENT to 
acquire shard. When k authenticate shards are accumulated, 
owner CLIENT computes the master secret from the k 
shards. Note a peer CLIENT should verify the public key of 
owner (PK) to make sure that it downloads, decrypts and 
sends the shard to right owner. When owner PKI key pairs 
are changed like certificate being expired, the owner should 
update its public key in peer employee’s shard record with 
the new one. 
To obtain the master secret, root attackers need compromise 
at least k peer CLIENTs in the peer list. One possible attack 
is that root attackers create k+ fake peer CLIENTs with k+ 
valid PKI key pairs; and exploit the peer selection to add the 
fake peers to owner’s peer list. However, short-distance 
peer-to-peer communication and owner’s visual verification 
significantly mitigate this attack scheme, yielding it almost 
impractical. 
3.2 Master Secret Escrow 
According threat model in 2.4, root attacker can compromise 
key escrow service (ESCROW), so it’s unsafe for owner 
employee to directly place the plaintext of his master secret 
to ESCROW. One solution is to take advantage of distance-
bounded social recovery and make peer CLIENTs to upload 
the encrypted shards to ESCROW (in step 4 of the secret 
sharing process mentioned above). On release of owner’s 
master secret, law enforcements ask the peer employees to 
decrypt and turn in the shards in out-of-band means, e.g., 
using QR codes to pass the decrypted shards to law 
enforcements’ devices; then the law enforcements can 
restore the master secret by running same secret sharing 
algorithm. To make this solution effective, two assumptions 
need hold: 1. Root attackers cannot successfully launch 
social engineering attacks and deceive the peer employees to 
submit the plaintexts of shards; 2. Owner employee need to 
be honest to distribute the authenticate shards to peer 
CLIENTs. The second assumption is not stronger than the 
case in which owner employee is required to directly submit 
plaintext of master key to ESCROW. 
4. Content Encryption 
Other than PKI key pair (PK, SK) and master key K_master, 
an employee generates two symmetric keys for each file: file 
encryption key (FEK) and file signature key (FSK). The 
FEK and FSK are used to differentiate between read and 
write access. Possession of only the FEK gives read only 
access to the file while possession of both the FEK and FSK 
allows read and write access. For example, a user with only 
the FEK cannot create a valid file because he cannot produce 
a valid file signature. In this way, a fine-grained file access 
control is achieved.  
In addition, we require PKI key pair (PK, SK) to be elliptic-
curve public-private key pair and serve Curve25519 
cryptography algorithm [17]. Thus, any two employees 
automatically and implicitly share one symmetric key via 
elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithm [18]. 
K_share_user1 represents one such key that an employee 
shares with user1. The employee uses K_share_user1 to 
share file with user1. 
 
Fig 2. Encrypted File Format 
4.1 File Format 
To support various content hosting services, we don’t 
directly modify the files’ metadata, which sometimes are 
stored separately with file data in hosting services and 
requires different APIs to make changes. Instead, we 
concatenate all encryption metadata to file data, which is 
transparent to hosting services. This design significantly 
reduces the engineering efforts required to integrate this new 
E2EE scheme to any existing content hosting application.  
An encrypted file is composed three parts: file header 
(encryption metadata), encrypted content and signature. 
Encrypted content represents the encrypted file data by using 
FEK, and signature represents the message authentication 
code (MAC) generated by using FSK to sign encrypted 
content. The file header is composed of group of user blocks. 
One user block contains the metadata that a user can use to 
read and/or write file data. Specifically, it contains the user 
ID (public key ID), FEK, FSK (or Dummy Key) and content 
offset.  
When a file owner wants to share his file with another user 
(user1), he creates one user block as [user1 ID, FEK, 
X_KEY, content offset]. If write permission is granted, 
X_KEY is FSK; otherwise, it’s a dummy key with same key 
size as FSK. Then, the user block is encrypted with 
K_share_user1, which is the implicit key shared between 
owner and user1. The first user block in a file header always 
belongs to file owner. Total number user blocks in a file 
header varies and depends on how many users that the owner 
grants file access to. When user1 accesses the owner’s file, 
starting from the second user block, he sequentially decrypts 
rest user blocks until the one that contains his user ID. Then, 
he uses content offset to determine the starting position of 
encrypted content and decrypt the content using FEK. The 
encrypted file formation is shown in figure 2.  
4.2 Freshness Guarantees 
Freshness guarantees are required in order to prevent 
rollback attacks. A rollback attack involves misleading users 
into accessing stale data. For example, suppose Bob revokes 
Alice’s permission to write to a file named foo. Alice does a 
rollback attack by replacing the new file header with an older 
version that she saved. The older version of the md-file has 
a valid signature and will hence verify correctly. Alice has 
now successfully restored her own write permissions to the 
file. Checking the file header for freshness would stop such 
an attack. 
We use a hash tree [19] to guarantee freshness. There is a 
file header freshness file (fhf-file) located in every directory 
of a user’s file system. This file contains the root of a hash 
tree built from all the fhf-files in the directory and its 
subdirectories. For example, the fhf-file at the root of a user’s 
home directory contains the root of the hash tree constructed 
from the user’s fhf-file in the directory and fhf-files under 
immediate subdirectories. A user’s CLIENT will 
periodically time stamp the root fhf-file and sign it using his 
master key K_master. The update interval can be set by the 
user. When a malicious user replaces the new file header 
with an old one. The file owner’s CLIENT will detect an 
unexpected root hash change and generate alert. 
4.3 Identityless Privacy 
File metadata (like access permissions) and file accessing 
records both can disclose privacy information [20]. For 
example, if root attackers find that a patient shares his health 
record file with a cancer doctor; or the cancer doctor visits 
his health record file multiple times, without decrypting the 
health record, they can conclude that the patient gets cancer 
with high probability. To address this issue, our E2EE 
scheme attempts to achieve the identityless privacy, which 
means that root attackers are blinded on who accesses a 
target file including owner himself. 
In 4.1, all user blocks are encrypted by symmetric keys 
shared between owner and other users, and all user blocks 
have equal length (recall dummy key), so root attackers 
cannot base file header to derive any information regarding 
authorized users and their access permissions for a target 
file. However, a user’s visits to SERVER and target file can 
disclose the privacy information and be tracked by root 
attackers. To solve this problem, a user can hide his network 
trace by using anonymous peer-to-peer network like Tor 
[21]; in addition, cloud storage services like Google Drive 
and Dropbox offer anonymous file sharing via links (anyone 
can access a file through randomized link as an anonymous 
user), and we can leverage this feature to hide the user’s 
login to SERVER. Concretely, file owner generates a file 
link and shares it with a user; and the user access the file by 
traveling an anonymous peer-to-peer network and login to 
SERVER as an anonymous user.       
5. Implementation 
We implemented a PoC (proof of concept) of master secret 
sharing and recovery in Android platform. Bluetooth is used 
to find peers around to share and recover master secret. This 
PoC uses Android API BluetoothAdapter to find peers and 
uses BluetoothServerSocket and BluetoothSocket to 
implement the communications between user and peer 
CLIENTs. It can be extended to support other protocols like 
NFC and peer-to-peer WiFi etc. When peer-to-peer WiFi is 
used, Android framework provides WiFiP2pManager API 
to create a WiFi peer-to-peer network which doesn't require 
internet access. The implementation of Shamir's Secret 
Sharing is provided by com.codahale.shamir module [22] 
which is an open source module under Apache license. 
Shamir's Secret Sharing needs to work on finite field and in 
this module it uses GF(256). When owner tries to recruit 
peers, owner can decide the number of peers (n) and a 
threshold (k), where n is in [k, 255] and k is in [1, n].  
The original com.codahale.shamir code will crash if n and k 
values are not legal, which is a bug. The PoC fixes it by 
checking the input n and k values, and prompting a message 
to ask user choose the right values. Inside the PoC, after user 
has made the decision, it will create a Scheme instance by 
using a secure random value and given n and k, then use the 
scheme instance to split the master secret. The output is a 
HashMap instance with entry <integer, byte array_of_byte>. 
Then each entry (key-value pair) will be sent to the selected 
peers. When user wants to recover the key, he needs to 
connect to those who have the valid key-value pairs, and 
once k key-value pairs have been collected, he can use the 
Scheme instance’s join() method to reconstruct the master 
secret. When switching between string and byte array, we 
use standard charset UTF-8.  
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, we propose a new E2EE solution that can 
defend against root attackers. It contains a new key recovery 
method called distance-bounded social recovery, based on 
which a new key escrow scheme is designed to prevent root 
attackers from accessing plaintexts of master secrets. In 
addition, a new content encryption scheme is devised to 
enjoy many plausible properties in comparison to current 
E2EE solutions, e.g., granular access control and identityless 
privacy.  
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